When we covered the nine-day trial in May, judgment was reserved and the outcome genuinely uncertain. On 22 July 2026, Justice Elizabeth Raper delivered her answer in MacInnes v Wilson [2026] FCA 957: the whole proceeding — defamation and breach of confidence — was dismissed, and Charlotte MacInnes was ordered to pay Rebel Wilson's costs. Within a day, MacInnes had filed a notice of appeal to the Full Court.
Strip away the celebrity gloss and this is one of the most instructive defamation judgments of 2026. It shows exactly how the modern statutory framework — pleaded imputations, the serious harm element in section 10A, and Australia's fractured post-reform uniformity — decides cases long before any jury-style assessment of who behaved badly.
The Claim in Brief
MacInnes, the lead of Wilson's directorial debut The Deb, sued over four sets of Instagram posts published between September 2024 and July 2025. The posts referenced an incident at Bondi involving producer Amanda Ghost, and — on MacInnes's pleaded case — conveyed that she had complained of sexual harassment and then changed her story in exchange for career advancement, effectively that she had been "paid off".
Wilson defended on every front: the posts did not convey the pleaded meanings; any meaning conveyed was not defamatory; MacInnes could not prove serious harm; and, in any event, what was said was substantially true.
Defamatory Meaning: Where the Case Was Really Lost
Justice Raper found that only one publication — the 23 September 2024 post — conveyed any of the pleaded meanings, and even then only the mildest of them: that MacInnes had changed her account of feeling "uncomfortable" about the incident. Her Honour rejected the more serious meanings. The ordinary reasonable reader would not have understood the post to allege an "exchange" for her music career, or that she had been paid off by a producer, or that she was the victim of "sexual harassment" as such.
Critically, the meaning that survived was held not to be defamatory at all. In a passage that will be quoted in submissions for years, her Honour said she did not accept "that the assertion of someone changing their story, for which there could be innumerable reasons for why they did, determined objectively by reference to community standards, is defamatory."
The lesson for prospective plaintiffs is blunt. A publication can be hurtful, embarrassing and career-complicating, yet still fail at the first hurdle because the meaning it actually conveys — assessed through the eyes of the ordinary reasonable reader, not the aggrieved subject — does not lower the plaintiff's reputation by community standards.
The Choice-of-Law Battle: NSW or WA?
One of the most consequential fights in the case looked, on paper, like a technicality. MacInnes argued Western Australian law should govern the claim; Wilson argued for New South Wales. The stakes were real: WA never adopted the Stage 1 reforms, so WA law contains no serious harm element. Under NSW law, section 10A of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) required MacInnes to prove the publication caused, or was likely to cause, serious harm to her reputation.
Justice Raper held NSW law applied, describing MacInnes's contrary submission as "perplexing". The incident occurred in NSW; MacInnes lived and worked in NSW during the formative period of her professional reputation between 2021 and 2024; and she auditioned for and filmed most of The Deb there. If damage was occasioned anywhere, it was in NSW — the jurisdiction with which the harm had its closest connection.
Five years after the Stage 1 reforms commenced, this is the sharpest illustration yet of Australia's broken uniformity. As we explained in our five-year retrospective on section 10A, the same set of Instagram posts can support a viable claim under WA law and a doomed one under NSW law. Forum and choice-of-law analysis is no longer a footnote — it can be the whole case. We saw the same dynamic from the other side in Reynolds v Higgins [2025] WASC 345, where WA's reform-free framework shaped the litigation.
Serious Harm: Ephemeral Posts, Fleeting Impressions
Although her findings on meaning disposed of the claim, Justice Raper went on to consider serious harm in the alternative — and found MacInnes would have failed there too.
The reach of the post
The 23 September post was live for roughly 24 hours, attracted somewhere between 5,000 and 100,000 views and about 1,050 likes. Her Honour found the ordinary reasonable reader "would have scrolled through the post relatively quickly and his or her reaction would have been impressionistic and fleeting". The ephemeral character of Instagram publications weighed directly against an inference of serious reputational damage.
Not a numbers game
MacInnes pointed to republication on celebrity gossip sites and Australian news coverage in the following months. Her Honour was unpersuaded, describing the republication submission as a bald one advanced without authority or any careful analysis of each republished article. Serious harm, she held, is not a "numbers game" resolved by pointing to mass-media pickup; the plaintiff must connect the publication sued upon to actual or likely serious harm.
Celebrity reach does not equal weight
Nor did Wilson's fame carry the day. While Wilson is a leading and well-known Australian actor, the evidence showed she was known for being outspoken "but not necessarily reliable" — undermining the suggestion that her posts would carry particular weight in the film industry. And MacInnes, whatever her "star quality", was found not to be well known in the music industry or to the public at large at the relevant time.
Credibility: No Winners in the Witness Box
The judgment is also a case study in why defamation trials are won and lost on credit. Justice Raper found problems with all three key witnesses: MacInnes had a tendency to avoid answering questions directly and to shape a narrative, and her account of the central incident "changed in material respects numerous times"; Ghost's evidence contained fatal inconsistencies; and Wilson, while composed, had a "propensity to exaggerate". Despite that, her Honour was satisfied on the contemporaneous evidence that MacInnes did complain to Wilson of feeling uncomfortable — which grounded the alternative finding that the surviving meaning was substantially true, engaging the justification defence in section 25.
The breach-of-confidence claim failed for a related reason: MacInnes had not established that she ever made a complaint of sexual harassment — the very information she alleged Wilson had improperly disclosed.
The Appeal
MacInnes's appeal challenges the findings on defamatory meaning and serious harm. The legally interesting question, as Professor David Rolph has observed, is what standard of appellate review applies to a trial judge's evaluative findings on meaning — the approach in Bazzi v Dutton [2022] FCAFC 84, or the stricter House v The King discipline the Victorian Court of Appeal applied in Gatto v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2022] VSCA 66. Whichever path the Full Court takes will matter well beyond this case.
What This Means If You Are Considering a Defamation Claim
Three practical points stand out. First, the meanings a court finds are the meanings an ordinary reasonable reader would take away — not the worst reading the subject of the post fears. Getting a hard-headed advice on meaning before litigating is essential. Second, in every jurisdiction except WA and the NT, serious harm is a real evidentiary burden: you need proof of actual reputational impact, not just view counts. Third, costs follow the event. MacInnes now faces a costs order after a two-week Federal Court trial — a sobering reminder of the stakes we detail in our guide to the cost of a defamation case in Australia.
None of this means social-media claims cannot succeed — courts continue to award substantial damages for serious online publications. It means case selection, a compliant concerns notice, and rigorous early assessment of meaning and harm matter more than ever. Our Defamation Law Guide walks through each element.
Disclaimer: This article is general information only and is not legal advice. Defamation law differs between Australian jurisdictions and outcomes depend on the facts of each matter. Obtain advice specific to your circumstances before acting.
Frequently Asked Questions
Why did Charlotte MacInnes lose her defamation case against Rebel Wilson?
Justice Raper found that only one of the pleaded meanings was conveyed, by only one post, and that meaning — that MacInnes had changed her story — was not defamatory by community standards. In the alternative, her Honour found MacInnes had not established serious harm under section 10A, and that the meaning was in any event substantially true.
What is the serious harm threshold in Australian defamation law?
Section 10A of the uniform Defamation Act 2005 requires a plaintiff to prove the publication caused, or is likely to cause, serious harm to their reputation. It applies in every Australian jurisdiction except Western Australia and the Northern Territory, and it is decided on evidence of actual impact rather than assumptions from the words alone.
Why did it matter whether NSW or WA law applied?
WA has not adopted the Stage 1 reforms, so WA law has no serious harm element. Had WA law applied, MacInnes would not have needed to prove serious harm at all. Justice Raper held NSW law governed because the alleged harm had its closest connection with NSW, where MacInnes built her professional reputation and where the underlying events occurred.
Is the decision being appealed?
Yes. MacInnes filed a notice of appeal to the Full Court of the Federal Court the day after judgment, challenging the findings on defamatory meaning and serious harm. The appeal will test the standard of appellate review of a trial judge's findings on meaning.